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IN THE SUPREIIB COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PRICE CONSTRUCTION CO., I~C., 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. Case No. 16,688 
HAL FOUTZ, et ux. , 
Defendant-Appellants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
Appeal from the Judgment of the Fourth Judicial 
District Court of Utah County, State of Utah 
Honorable David San, presiding 
Richard S. Dalebout 
60 East 100 South 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Attorney for Respondent 
THOMAS S. TAYLOR, for 
CHRISTEHSEN, TAYLOR & MOODY 
55 East Center Street 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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rn THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PRICE CONSTRUCTION CO., INC., 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
VS. Case No. 16, 688 
HAL FOUTZ, et ux., 
Defendants-Appellants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLAUTS 
STATEMENT OF THE rTATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff brought suit in unlawful retainer against 
defendants for possession of home and treble damages; together 
with an action for the court determining ownership and immediate 
possession of the residence together with a reasonable attorney's 
fee and costs. Defendant counterclair.Jed for specific performance 
of contract or in the alternative to specific performance, damages, 
both compensatory and punitive together with a reasonable attorney's 
fee and costs. 
DISPOSITION Ill LOWER COURT 
The Honorable David Sam of the Fourth Judicial District 
Court of Utah County, without a jury, ruled that the Earnest Money 
Receipt was a clear, u~ambigious and final contract; that 
plaintiff was entitled to ir:nnediate possession of the house and 
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ordered defendants to vacate the residence; that defendants were 
entitled to have returned the $10, 000. 00 down payment less $350.~I 
per month as rent for the premises during defendants' occupancy. 
The court ruled that the Earnest Money Receipt was a final contraq 
and that the defendants were in default. The court further 
ruled that defendants were guilty of unlawful detainer, that 
plaintiff was entitled to treble damages but offset the treble 
damages by reason of the increased value of the house since the 
parties entered into the contract of sale. The court allowed 
an offset of plaintiff's damages against the $10,000.00 down 
payment which defendants made on the house. The court gave 
defendants credit for $300.00 improvement on the yard, improve-
ments in the house not to exceed $1,000.00 and awarded plaintiff 
$1,550.00 in attorney's fee together with costs. The court 
ruled that 61-2-2 UCA, 1953, was not applicable. The court 
further ruled that the plaintiff had made full disclosure to 
defendants and had not misrepresented the house. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek reversal of the decision of the lower 
court; to have this court determine that the Earnest Money Receipt 
was not a final contract and that the parties should make and enter 
into the final contract, with all of the terms, as provided for 
in the Earnest Money Receipt. Or in the alternative, to determine 
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that under the facts plaintiff did misrepresent the house to 
defendants, that said misrepresentations were material. Appellants 
request this court to rule that the decision of the lower court 
amounts to a wrongful unjust enrichment to plaintiffs of 
approximately $15,000.00. Appellants request this court to rule 
that Title 61, UCA 1953 applies to the facts of this case and 
that defendants are entitled, as a matter of law, to damages. 
STATEMEiH OF FACTS 
The parties signed a Earnest Money Receipt and Offer 
co Purchase, the printed form used by realtors, on November 29, 
1977, at which time plaintiff sold to defendant a residence in 
Orem, Utah, for the purchase price of $52,000.00, $600.00 which 
was paid down as earnest money. The Earnest Money Agreement 
provided for rent at the rate of $350.00 a month to be paid 
to Seller, plaintiff, until the final closing of the sale and 
the final agreement between the parties. Defendants paid the 
rent and was having difficulty in selling their residence in 
Las Vegas, Nevada, which was stated in said Earnest Money Receipt. 
The earnest money payment of $600.00 was paid to the president 
of plaintiff corporation, who was also a principal officer and 
stockholder in the real estate broker involved. The $600.00 
earnest money was not placed into a trust account of either 
the broker or the plaintiff. 
On May 25, 1978, the parties signed a second Earnest 
Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase, the pre-printed form, at 
which time appellants paid to respondents $10,000.00. The second 
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Earnest Money Receipt expressly stated that it superseded the 
first Earnest Honey Receipt. Again, the $10,000.00 was 
delivered to Mr. Larry Price, president of plaintiff and a 
principal officer and stockholder in the real estate company 
involved. (Ex. 1, ; TR 7, Line 10; TR 15, Line 3) The Earnest 
Money Receipt, Exhibit 1, was prepared by plaintiff's employee 
and realtor agent. (TR 18) The $10,000.00 payment made by 
appellant to respondent went as a part payment on the lot of 
the house in question and sold to appellants. (TR 38, Line 13) 
Hr. Lund, the real estate agent and employee of Larry Price, 
President of respondent, informed appellants that Seller would 
not pay the FHA or VA points on the house. He specifically 
told appellants that "they could probably finance the home FHA 
if they were willing to make an offer at a higher price than 
$52,000.00 list price." (TR 42, Lines 8-12) Mr. Lund, realtor, 
agent and employee of the president of plaintiff corporation, 
told Mr. Foutz that the residence in question would probably 
qualify for an FHA or VA loan. (TR 51, Line 14-17) 
Appellants could not get conventional financing on 
the house by reason of them opening a new self-employed business 
in the State of Utah. Appellants applied to approxinately 
ten places for a conventional loan, as recorrnnended and assisted 
by Mr. Lund, realtor, agent and e!'lployee of Larry Price, president 
of plaintiff. (TR 75, Line 5-10; 76, Line 18-21) 
Appellants did not know that the house in question 
would not qualify for VA or FHA loan on May 25, 1978, the signing 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-5-
of the Earnest Money Receipt, Exhibit 1, and would not have 
purchased the house had appellants realized the house would 
not qualify for VA or FHA loan. Appellants pursued conventional 
financing at the suggestion of Mr. Lund, plaintiff's realtor 
and agent and relied upon Mr. Lund for the conventional financing. 
(TR 97, Line 10-13) The conventional loans did not materialize 
because the conventional loan money at that time dried up. 
(TR 98, Line 1,2) Prior to and during the time of the trial 
herein, appellants had applied for a VA or FHA loan and the 
matter was being processed (TR 97, Line 14-26). Appellants are 
willing to pay any and all necessary discount points under the 
law to qualify for VA or FHA by reason of increase in purchase 
price or otherwise. (TR 99, Line 4-7) Appellants could have 
borrowed money by reason of the value of the house in question 
to pay any necessary additional costs of the VA or FHA discount 
points. (TR 104, Line 24-30; TR 105, Line 1) 
The appraised valuation of the house in question on 
August of 1978 was $58,000.00. (TR 105, Line 25) Appellants 
discovered the house would not qualify for FHA because it was 
in a planned unit development and specific items must be done 
to qualify said house for FHA financing. (TR 76, Line 19-21; 
TR 81, Line 25-30) The value of the house at the time of the 
trial was between $65,000.00 and $75,000.00. (TR 49, Line 28-29) 
Mr. Brian Crandall, one of the employees of plaintiff 
and a witness of respondents, testified that prior to the signing 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-6-
of the Earnest Money Receipt, it was not disclosed to appellants 
that the house would not qualify for VA or FHA. (TR 122, Line 25-.1 
Appellants tendered and offered to enter into a final 
real estate contract, spelling out all of the terms and agreemen:: 
between the parties, but respondents failed and refused to do so 
All during the negotiations, the sale, and the attet:'.lpts 
for financing, the realtor-agent, Mr. Lund, was an enployee and 
agent of Mr. Larry Price, president of plaintiff corporation; 
Mr. Price having an interest in the real estate company involved 
and being one of the owners of said real estate cor:ipany. (TR 36, 
Line 7-21) 
The earnest money payr:ients, both the $600.00 and 
the $10,000.00 were not placed into a trust fund of the realtor 
and there was no formal closing of the contract or the final 
contract entered into. 
Exhibit 1 attached to defendants' r:iemorandum of facts 
and authorities on the above natter and entitled "Statement of 
Cost and Irortgage Loan Required by Regulation Z" is the standard 
application forr:i for FHA loans as used by First Security Bank 
which is typical. On said Exhibit 1, there is a specific provisi.:l 
that states for a disclosure of the loan discount fee to be paid 
by the buyer or the loan discount fee to be paid by the seller. 
This is specific evidence on the standards and practice of the 
financing trade and the FHA regulations. Attached as Exhibit 2 
to the same defendants' neaorandurn, is a copy of the rules and 
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regulations of the State of Utah Real Estate License Law and 
as having been adopted in Utah County as well as other counties 
in the State of Utah. Said regulations provide in part as follows: 
l. On Page 5, Paragraph 14C it provides for the broker 
to prepare closing statements. This was not done 
in the case now before the court. 
2. Paragraph 15 provides for the placing of 100% of 
all funds belonging to others into a trust account 
by brokers involved. This was not done in the 
case pending before the court. 
3. Paragraph 25 provides that when the seller fails 
or is unable to consurmnate the contract, the broker 
has no right to any portion of the money deposited 
by the buyer and relates specifically to earnest 
money. This has not been done in the case now 
pending before the court. 
The Earnest Money ~eceipt (Exhibit 1) calls for rent of 
$350.00 per month. OnAugust 15, 1978, plaintiff sent a notice 
to defendants unilaterally attempting to raise the rent to 
$600.00 per month. The purpose being to try to force defendant 
out of the house. (TR 49, Line 4-11) 
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ARGUME:1T 
POEH I 
LOWER COURT ERR.ED U RULElG PLAJ:HIFF' S AGE;ffS NOT 
"A REAL ESTATE BROKER" AilD rn A FIDUCIARY CAPACITY 
AS DEFINED IN 61-2-2 UCA, 1953 
Exhibit 1, the Earnest Money Receipt in question, 
is a pre-printed form in this case prepared by and furnished 
by the seller and his agents. The Earnest Money Agreement 
specifially provides on Line 33 that there will be either a 
contract of sale or an instrument of conveyance; Line 39 that 
it constitutes "the entire preliminary contract" and then goes 
on further and stated "as further agreed that execution of the 
final contract shall abrogate this Earnest Money Receipt and 
Offer to Purchase." It is clear from the language of the 
Earnest Money Receipt and the intention of the parties that 
the Earnest Honey Receipt is merely a prelimiriary agreement. 
Prior to and during the course of the trial, appellants 
offered to enter into a final agreement between the parties and 
incorporating the provisions and Earnest i"!oney Receipt, the 
oral discussions and particularly the question of discount points 
for FHA or VA financing. Appellants specifically requested 
specific performance to order the parties to enter into a 
final contract. There are many items in the final contract 
that will have to be specifically described that are not in 
the Earnest Money Receipt. The financing of the property is 
still being worked on and appellants are not in default of the 
' __.,., 
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Earnest >loney Receipt. They have been paying rent, parties 
agreed that rent could be deducted from the $10,000.00 payment 
by appellants to respondent. Specific performance is an equitable 
relief and under the facts of this case appellants are entitled 
to equitable relief to conclude the purchase between the parties. 
The purchase price has been defined, the fact that 
respondent is getting rent until the installment payments or 
lump sum paynents are made protects the respondent from any loss. 
The failure of respondent to inform appellants that the house 
would not qualify for FllA or VA and the fact that respondent's 
agents steered appellants to conventional financing is the reason 
for the delay in the final contract and payments to which respondent 
is entitled. 
In Bunnell vs. Bills, 13 Utah 2d 83, 368 P2d 597, this 
court ruled that an Earnest Money Recei,t was a binding contract 
that can be specifically enforced, under the facts of that case. 
Appellants seek to enforce the Earnest Money Receipt provisions 
together with the other provisions not mentioned in said Earnest 
Money Receipt. This fact situation before the court graphically 
illustrates the necessity for final contracts as provided for 
and which may be enforced under these Earnest lfoney Receipts. 
Failure to specifically enforce the contract of appellants constitutes 
unjust enrichment to the respondent in the sum of approximately 
$15,000.00. Appellants have performed and are continuing their 
perforoance under the agreeoent between the parties. The delays 
in the closing is a result of the failure to disclose and mis-
information furnished appellants by respondent and its agents. 
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POINT II 
LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING PLAINTIFF A~m HIS AGENTS 
DID i:i"OT BREACH A FIDUCIARY DUTY IN FAILING TO 
PLACE PAYMENTS ItlTO TRUST ACCOUNT AS PROVIDED FOR 
EJ 61-2-11 UCA, 1953; AND ERRED FAILHlG TO AWARD 
PEHALTY PROVISION AGAINST PLAINTIFF AS PROVIDED 
IN 61-2-17 UCA, 1953. 
61-2-2 UCA, 1953, defines"real estate broker" and 
states in part as follows: " . . the term "real estate 
broker" shall also include any person, partnership, association 
or corporation employed by or on behalf of the owner or owners 
of lots or other parcels of real estate .. This section 
makes an exception to some isolated sales and where you are 
your own owner and selling your mm property. The evidence 
before this court clearly discloses that Mr. Price does not 
have an interest in the licensed real estate broker involved, 
Courtesy Real Estate; that Mr. Price was the contractor that 
built the house and his representative, Hr. Lund, was the individua 
working with appellants for the financing. 
The evidence discloses that the original $600.00 on 
the first Earnest Money Receipt was not placed into a trust 
account nor was the $10, 000. 00 payr.1ent made by appellants to 
respondents. 
61-2-11 UCA 1953, has provision for the requirement 
of depositing earnest money and down payments in trust account 
of the real estate broker. It describes that failure to do so 
is grounds for revocation or suspension of the license of the 
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broker. 
The section further discusses that there must be 
adequate records of these transactions, how the trust funds 
are held and whether used by the builder, the amounts of the 
commissions and to whom the proceeds were disbursed. There is 
no evidence before the court that this has been done. See 
Reese vs. Harper, 8 Utah 2d 119, 329 P2d 410, as distinguished 
in 10 Utah 2d 930, 297; 353 P2d 989; and 29 Utah 2d 280, 508 P2d 
542, which hold as follows: 
"A broker has the responsibility of honestly and 
fairly representing those who engage his services 
and because of this specialized service the broker 
offers as an agent for his client, there arises 
a fiduciary agreeoent between them." 
The State of Utah Real Estate License Law Rules and 
Regulations specifically provide under 61-2-5(b) that there shall 
be closing statements, that the broker shall be held responsible 
for correctness of all closing statements; it further provides 
for a trust account to be used for all down payment, earnest 
monies, costs, rents, payments on contracts, mortgages, etc. 
"The said trust account shall at all times contain 100% of all 
funds belonging to others." (See Paragraph 15 of the printed 
brochure, which is attached to appellants' memorandum on file.) 
Paragraph 25 of said regulation and laws specifically provides 
in part: "When for any reason seller fails or is unable to 
consunnnate a contract, the broker has no right to any portion 
of the money deposited with him by the buyer." 
It is clear as to the importance of these rules and 
regulations, which have not been followed and have been refused 
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by respondents, their agents and the realtors involved. There 
has been a total of $10,600.00 in down payments made upon the 
property as well as rent paid by appellants at the rate of 
approxir.iately $350.00 a month since November, 1977, to and 
including the present time by reason of cash payments and credits 
agreed upon toward the $10,000.00 payment made to respondent; 
all as agreed upon between the parties. Hone of these funds 
have been trust funded as required by law. The importance 
of this regulation is pointed out in this case before the court 
to require the parties to enter into a final contract. The 
final contract in this case would avoid the problems of failure 
to disclose the financibility of the house in question and 
avoid many problems for all parties. Respondent refuses to enter 
into the final contract for the reason that they are getting rent 
on the property, and are receiving the equivalent of a for-
feiture of $15,000.00 in increased value to the house in questioo. 
61-2-11, UCA 1953, specifically requires rent, earnest 
monies, down payments, payments on contracts, all to be placed 
into a trust account until the final contract between the 
parties is entered into. This has not been done in the case beforel 
I 
the court. All of the parties would be strongly motivated to 
enter into thefinal contract if these funds had been deposited 
' 
on trust, the final contract entered into and the closing are 
required by law performed. See 61-2-2, UCA 1953; 61-2-11, UCA 1951\ 
61-2-17, UCA 1953; 61-2-5(b), UCA 1953. I 
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POEJT III 
LOWER COURT ERRED FAILHlG TO FIND MISREPRESENTATION AS 
TO FINAi'lCIBILITY OF HOUSE A~m DEFE@ANTS' RIGHT TO DAMAGES 
AS A RESUl.T THEREOF. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, LOHER COURT 
ERRED TO GRANT SPECIFIC PERFO~TCE IN THE FORM OF A FINAL 
CONTRACT OF SALE BE':'HEEN THE P&."lTIES AND THEREFORE CAUSED 
UNJUST ENRIC!-IMENT TO DEFE~WANTS. 
Mr. Lund, Agent of Respondent, specifically testified 
that prior to the signing of the Earnest Money Agreement in 
question, that he nor none of the agents or representatives 
of respondent informed the appellants that the house would not 
then qualify for FHA or VA; and that it probably would qualify. 
Appellants testified that they relied upon their understanding 
that tne house would qualify for FHA or VA loans; that they 
preferred FHA or VA loans but that respondent's agents kept 
encouraging them and steering them towards conventional laons 
at a tioe when the conventional loan money had dried up. 
Appellants specifically testified that they would not have 
purchased the house had they known that the house would not 
qualify for FHA or VA loans. This is a specific example of 
failure to disclose the fact that the house did not qualify but 
they were informed that it probably would qualify. As a direct 
result of reliance upon this misrepresentation, the proper 
financing and loans were not closed or obtained. The evidence 
is clear that these applications are still pending before FHA 
and VA. The elements of misrepresentation, to wit, false 
statements, material fact, reliance upon, and damage, are all 
present in the case now before this court. 
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As a direct result of this material fact and mis-
representation, appellants have been damaged by the amount of 
the money that they have paid in the form of rent, payments of 
$10,600.00, and a loss of increase in the value of the home 
in approximately $15,000.00. 
Appellants are clearly entitled to damages as provided 
for in Title 61 for failure to trust fund the payments, together 
with all other damages, which were tendered in the form of 
evidence at the time of the trial of this matter in the lower 
court. The lower court erroneous ruled that the unlawful 
detainer, Title 78, Chapter 36, UCA 1953, applied; in that 
this was not a landlord-tenant situation but was a seller and 
buyer relationship in which the buyer agreed to pay rent during 
the term of the preliminary contract. The damages requested 
were in the alternative to specific performance of the final 
contract of sale between the parties. 
Under the evidence, appellants, the buyer, could and 
would have paid any and all discount points for FHA. This is 
another item that needed to be placed in the final contract 
between the parties and which was some of the many discussions 
on the subject matter. 
POitlT IV 
LOWER COURT ERRED rn A\JARDIHG ATTORNEY FEES 
TO PLArnTIFF 
The contract between the parties was enforceable and 
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still in force and effect without default on the part of 
appellants. Rent had been paid in the form of cash and, as 
agreed beti;1een the parties, credits of $351). 00 per month upon 
the $10,000.00 payment by appellant to respondent. The matter 
was not "closed" for the reason that the final contract had 
not been entered into or proposed. Appellants proferred a 
final contract prior to cornmenceoent of suit. The VA and FHA 
loan applications are still pending and were at the time of 
the comr;iencewent of suit. Title 78, Chapter 36, UCA, unlawful 
detainer, does not apply to a buy and sell agreeoent; this 
not being a landlord-tenant situation even though rent was 
being paid until the contract was finalized and closed. 
The parties had, by their conduct, waived the strict time for 
closing the contract particularly where respondent refused 
to enter into a final contract, which was required. 
There being no default on the part of appellants, 
the court erred in awarding attorney's fees and costs. To the 
contrary, respondents refu~ed to enter into a final contract, 
misled appellants on the financing and created the problems 
complained of. Their conduct clearly amounts to an unjust 
enrichment which equity forbids. 
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C0'.'1CLUS ION 
The lower court erred in ruling that the unlawful 
detainer statute applied where in fact there has been and was 
an enforceable sale between the parties. The lower court 
erred in construing the Earnest Money Receipt as the final 
contract between the parties when it expressly, under its 
terms, provides for a final contract to be entered into between 
the parties including the financing arrangements or installment 
payments to be made under the final contract. The facts of 
this case clearly demonstrate appellants are entitled to 
specific perfo~ance of the Earnest Money Receipt and the 
entering into a final contract. Respondent wrongfully refused 
to enter into a final contract. 
The conduct of the parties waived any specific 
time element particularly where agents for respondents mis-
represented and misled appellants in trying to obtain financing. 
Title 61 UCA, 1953, applies in the case now before 
this court. Respondent and its agents clearly failed to 
trust fund the pa~ents made by appellants and disbursed the 
funds unlawfully. This has specifically damaged appellants I 
herein. A!Jpellants have suffered damages, if specific performance 
is notgranted,in the sum of $10,600.00 in installment pa~ents 
together with loss in value of the house in the sum of approximate' 
$15,000.00, together with attorney's fee and costs and provided 
for in the Earnest Money Receipt. The lower court has committed I 
Appellants are entitled to specific performance! reversible error. 
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of the Earnest Money Receipt or in the alternative the damages 
herein described. 
Respectfully submitted this ~day of December, 1979. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This is to certify that two true and exact copies 
of the foregoing Brief of Appellants were mailed to 
Richard S. Dalebout, Attorney for Respondent, 60 East 100 South, 
Provo, Utah 84601, postage prepaid, this J}~ay of December, 
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